When JPMorgan Chase agreed to take over Apple Card from Goldman Sachs, the obvious question from investors wasn't why Chase wanted the portfolio — it was whether they understood what they were walking into. Goldman Sachs lost billions on this exact product. Multiple banks examined the deal and walked away. And the core problem — a subprime borrower rate significantly higher than industry norms — didn't disappear just because the counterparty changed.

This week, at Chase's 2026 Company Update, CFO Jeremy Barnum answered those questions directly. And the explanation is more confident than you might expect.

We covered the full backdrop of this deal when it was announced in January — the Goldman Sachs losses, the troubled history, and what the transition means for cardholders — in our original analysis here. This is what's changed since then.

Chase's Core Argument

The number that sank Goldman was Apple Card's subprime borrower rate of roughly 34% — dramatically higher than Chase's own portfolio average of 15% and even above Capital One's 31%. That discrepancy fueled delinquency rates, charge-offs, and ultimately billions in losses that Goldman was neither equipped nor experienced enough to manage.

Barnum's response to investor concerns was straightforward: Chase already operates in this space at scale. Subprime borrowers already make up about 15% of Chase's current credit card portfolio, and given the relative size of the Apple Card book, adding it won't move that number meaningfully. More to the point, Barnum said Chase has the "data, experience, and capabilities" to integrate the portfolio successfully — framing the subprime exposure not as a novel risk, but as terrain Chase knows well.

It's a subtle but important distinction from Goldman's position in 2019. Goldman bid aggressively for a consumer credit product it had no real infrastructure to support. Chase is walking in with decades of consumer lending experience, established collections processes, and a charge-off rate roughly half of Goldman's. The risk profile of the Apple Card portfolio is genuinely higher than a typical Chase acquisition — but Chase is a genuinely different institution than Goldman's consumer banking arm was.

What Chase Has That Goldman Didn't

The comparison that matters here isn't Goldman's losses versus Chase's optimism. It's the underlying operational differences that explain why the same portfolio could perform so differently under new management.

Goldman Sachs entered consumer lending as a prestige play, building from scratch on the strength of the Apple brand. They didn't have mature debt recovery operations. They weren't aggressive (or effective) at collecting on charged-off balances. And their dispute-handling systems were so inadequate that the CFPB fined Apple and Goldman a combined $89 million in October 2024 for failing to investigate tens of thousands of customer disputes properly.

Chase doesn't have those gaps. The bank handles hundreds of millions of consumer transactions annually and has been in the credit card business for decades. When Barnum says Chase is "not a stranger to subprime," he's pointing to an institutional muscle Goldman simply never built.

There's also the matter of scale. Chase adds roughly 10 million new credit card accounts each year. Apple Card's approximately $21 billion in receivables is a meaningful addition but won't reshape the bank's risk posture. Goldman, managing a fraction of that volume, felt every wave of Apple Card defaults more acutely.

The Questions That Remain

Investor confidence aside, Chase's reassurance doesn't answer the question that matters most to the roughly 12 million Apple Card holders watching this transition: what changes after January 2028?

Chase wasn't able to simply absorb this portfolio at face value — they acquired it at a discount exceeding $1 billion and booked a $2.2 billion provision for credit losses when JPMorgan reported Q4 2025 earnings. That's not accounting theater; it's a real signal that Chase expects a meaningful portion of this portfolio to underperform. The provision creates a buffer, but it also creates pressure to adjust the portfolio's risk profile over time.

The most likely lever is underwriting. Chase operates with more conservative approval standards than Goldman employed under Apple's influence. Goldman was effectively pushed to approve as many iPhone users as possible, trading credit quality for volume. Chase, entering from a position of strength rather than desperation, won't feel that same pressure. Whether Apple grants Chase the underwriting latitude Goldman was denied will define how this partnership ages.

The other open question is what Chase does with the subprime borrowers already in the portfolio. Tighter standards going forward don't help with existing cardholders who are already carrying balances. Chase's superior collections infrastructure should help recover more from charge-offs than Goldman managed — but it doesn't eliminate the risk, it just manages it more professionally.

A More Honest Partnership

What Barnum's comments signal, more than anything, is that Chase entered this deal with clear eyes. They know the portfolio skews riskier than their norm. They priced that in. And they're betting their operational depth is the variable that flips the outcome from Goldman's disaster to a workable business.

That's a reasonable bet. But it's worth noting what Chase didn't say: they didn't promise Apple Card will be a breakout profit center, they didn't commit to preserving every current benefit unchanged, and they didn't claim the subprime exposure is actually fine. They said they know how to handle it — which is a different, more measured kind of confidence.

For Apple, that measured confidence is probably exactly what they need from a banking partner right now. Goldman's aggressive posture during the initial pitch led to structural problems the partnership never recovered from. A Chase that walks in sober about the risks, with the infrastructure to manage them, is worth more than a partner that overpromises and underdelivers.

The transition completes in January 2028. Between now and then, Chase will be assessing every corner of that portfolio. Current cardholders shouldn't panic — but they should pay attention to what changes once Chase has had a full year to work with what Goldman left behind.

For full background on the Goldman Sachs exit, the deal structure, and what the transition means for Apple Card holders, read our original coverage: JPMorgan Chase Takes Over Apple Card: The End of Goldman Sachs' Costly Consumer Banking Experiment.